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A Hartman Hotz Symposium:
Intelligence, Law, and Democracy
Lord Robin Butler
William Howard Taft IV
Alberto Mora
Steve Sheppard
Introduced by Dean Donald R. Bobbit
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the attacks of 2001, the United States has been
confronted with great challenges in its efforts to protect its soil,
its people, and its interests. Perhaps none have been as
challenging as the extent to which the President and other
officials may act without oversight in their acquisition of
intelligence and use of that information. Many novel practices
have had repercussions across the globe as well as in Arkansas:
the long-term detention of both foreign nationals and American
citizens without judicial review; the use of brutal enhanced
interrogation procedures on those detained; the trial of prisoners
by military commissions when the courts are open; the mass
interception of communications and seizure of papers without a
warrant; and the routine excuse of national security to justify
increased police activities against immigrants, students,
travelers, citizens, and ordinary criminal suspects.
Since 2001, the Congress, the Supreme Court, federal and
state officials, lawyers and bar associations have been engaged
in myriad debates over the power of the executive to define its
own authority over these matters, as well as the powers of
Congress to retreat from what was once thought to be the clear
dictates of both constitutional and international law. These
debates have brought into question the roles of the people in a
democracy and of the rule of law, as well as the degree, in times
of danger, to which democracy and legal rules are essential or
optional. Through these debates thread arguments of necessity
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and effectiveness: what is gained and what is lost if torture,
brutality, domestic spying, and detention without review are
allowed?
On April 25, 2007, the University of Arkansas hosted an
extraordinary symposium under the auspices of the Hartman
Hotz Trust, to consider the intersection of intelligence, law and
democracy. The presenters included three guests with
extraordinary experience in dealing with problems in the legal
environment of acquisition and use of intelligence: Lord Robin
Butler, former head of the British Civil Service and now Master
of University College, Oxford; Alberto Mora, former General
Counsel of the United States Navy and now Vice President of
Wal-Mart Stores; and William Howard Taft IV, former Acting
Secretary of Defense and Legal Counsel of the State
Department, now Warren Christopher Professor at Stanford
University.
Collectively, these guests represent very diverse
experiences in law and the oversight and management of
intelligence. Most importantly, all three have been required to
consider what information gathered by professional intelligence
agencies is reliable, what techniques are lawful, and what
processes are essential in the defense of their respective
countries. The discussion was moderated and encouraged by
Don Bobbit, Dean of the Fulbright College, and Steve Sheppard,
Enfield Professor of Law. Contributions in absentia were
provided by Professor Jeremy Waldron of New York University
School of Law, whose valiant attempts to reach Fayetteville in
time for the discussion were thwarted by a storm during his air
travel.
II. PANELIST BIOGRAPHIES
The Right Honorable Lord Butler of Brockwell, KG, GCB,
CVO, is Master of University College, Oxford. His career in the
public service in the United Kingdom began in 1961 in the
British Treasury, serving later as Private Secretary to Prime
Ministers Edward Heath, Harold Wilson, and Margaret
Thatcher. He as appointed Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of
Home Civil Service in 1988, serving in that role under Prime
Ministers Margaret Thatcher, John Major, and Tony Blair, in
which roles, he was responsible for some aspects of the
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management of security and intelligence in the United Kingdom.
He has served as Master of University College since 1998. In
2004, Lord Butler chaired a Review by a Committee of the
Queen's Privy Councillors to examine British intelligence on
weapons of mass destruction prior to the decision to invade Iraq.
Mr. Alberto J. Mora is Vice President and General Counsel
for the International Division of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. His
public service began in 1975 as a member of the U.S. Foreign
Service in Portugal. After private practice, he was appointed
general counsel to the U.S. Information Agency and served as a
member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversee
Voice of America, among other operations. He was appointed
General Counsel of the U.S. Navy in 2001 by President George
W. Bush, with responsibility for legal matters affecting both the
Navy and the Marine Corps. He opposed efforts by the
Department of Justice to approve the use of torture against
prisoners, a policy subsequently disavowed by the White House.
Mora was awarded the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage
Award in 2006.
Professor William Howard Taft IV is of counsel to Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP, in its Washington, D.C.
office, and is also the Warren Christopher Professor of the
Practice of International Law and Diplomacy in the Stanford
Law School. Following an early career in private practice and
public service in the United States he was appointed in 1976 to
be general counsel to the U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, in 1981 becoming general counsel to the
Department of Defense before being appointed Deputy
Secretary of Defense and then Acting Secretary of Defense.
From 1989-1992, he was U.S. Permanent Representative to
NATO, a position he held during the first Gulf War. After a
period again in private practice, in 2001 Ambassador Taft was
appointed Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, in
which capacity he fought the use of torture in American prisons.
After four years he returned to private practice, writing, and
teaching.
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Dr. Donald R. Bobbit is Dean of the Fulbright College of
Arts and Science and Professor of Chemistry and Biochemistry
in the University of Arkansas. He is a member of the Trustees
of the Hartman Hotz Trust.
Steve Sheppard is the William Enfield Professor of Law in
the University of Arkansas School of Law and a member of the
Trustees of the Hartman Hotz Trust.
This symposium was sponsored by the Hartman Hotz
Trust, a fund created in honor of Professor Hartman Hotz by his
family, which promotes the intellectual community of the
Fulbright College and the School of Law by supporting
intellectually challenging events of interest to scholars and
students in both divisions of the University of Arkansas. The
following is a transcription of this symposium on intelligence,
law, and democracy.
III. PANEL DISCUSSION
DEAN BOBBITT: Good afternoon. I'm Donald Bobbitt,
Dean of the J. William Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences
along with my colleague Dean Cindi Nance of the School of
Law. I welcome you to this final event in the 2006-2007 series
of Hartman Hotz lectures. Just as a word of background,
Hartman Hotz was a distinguished graduate of the University of
Arkansas. He went on to Yale Law School and later assumed a
faculty role here at the University of Arkansas. Over the years
of his career, he was a much decorated and honored teacher and
scholar.
The endowment that supports this lecture series was
established by his brother, Dr. Palmer Hotz, and family to honor
his memory. This endowment and this series lecture are jointly
administered by the School of Law and the J. William Fulbright
College of Arts and Sciences. The purpose of these lectures is
quite simple. It is to bring to campus new voices to challenge
and inform, and I believe that today's discussion is a capstone of
a stimulating year of lectures. The topic today is both timely and
critically important to our society. I want to offer some thanks
before we began today's program to the Hartman Hotz
Committee. It includes Dr. Palmer Hotz, Dean Cindy Nance,
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Dr. Barbara Taylor, Dr. Jeannie Whayne and Professor Steve
Sheppard. In fact, Steve Sheppard serves as the intellectual
force behind today's lecture. He is an accomplished and
decorated teacher and scholar. In addition he is simply
unflappable. Please join me in welcoming Professor Sheppard
to the podium to introduce the other members of the panel and
the format for today's discussion. Professor Sheppard.
PROFESSOR SHEPPARD: Thank you, Dean. Good
afternoon. As Dean Bobbitt said, this is a wonderful opportunity
to complete a fascinating year for the Hartman Hotz lecture
program. It is a tremendous honor for me to be able to introduce
the members of this panel. First, let me introduce Lord Butler.
Robin Butler is the Master of University College, Oxford. To
say he has had a distinguished career in the government of Great
Britain is an understatement. Having served as the personal
secretary to four prime ministers and the cabinet secretary to
three other prime ministers, he is perhaps singularly the most
acute observer of the executive in Great Britain in the later 20th
century. He is the Right Honorable Lord Frederick Edward
Robin Butler, Baron Butler of Brockwell, Knight of the Garter,
Order of the Bath, as a Grand Commander, as a CVO, as a
member of the Privy Council.
He was educated at Harrow and University College, Oxford
where most importantly he was a Rugby Blue. He joined the
treasury and worked for a variety of institutions but especially
was private secretary to Prime Ministers Heath, Wilson, and
Thatcher. He then was Cabinet Secretary, which is to say the
head of the Home Civil Service, effectively the person to whom
the entire civil service of Great Britain reports, including the
Joint Intelligence Committee. In this role he would be, in a
fictional world, the boss of James Bond's boss's boss. I think
that's accurate.
Upon his retirement from government, he became Lord
Baron-a member of the House of Lords and Baron Butler
Brockwell and has served with tremendous distinction as leader
of University College, Oxford. University College has a
reasonable claim as the oldest living institution of higher
education in the English-speaking world.
William Howard Taft IV is, I'm pleased to announce,
recently appointed the Warren Christopher Professor of the
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Practice of International Law and Diplomacy at Stanford
University. He has served in the United States in a variety of
government positions after a B.A. from Yale and a J.D. from
Harvard Law School: working in the Federal Trade
Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, and the
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. He has also
served as the ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
He was very, very influential and a very long serving
member of the senior administration of the Department of
Defense, serving not only as Deputy Secretary but as interim
Secretary of Defense in the first President Bush's
administration. He has actually served very widely throughout
the government, but in his most recent appointment was the
legal counsel to the Department of State and, therefore, was
Colin Powell's lawyer and the chief legal officer for American
diplomacy.
Alberto J. Mora-it is a pleasure to root for the hometown
man. Mr. Mora is presently the Vice President of Wal-Mart in
charge of all of their international legal operations. As such, he
has supervisory roles over legal staffs, not only in the United
States and Europe working on international legal matters for
Wal-Mart, but also in Asia and we suspect soon in Africa.
Alberto Mora has a B.A. from Swarthmore and has been
practicing law following his degree from the University of
Miami. He has served not only as a diplomatic officer in the
Department of State but has had a variety of executive
appointments, including in the United States Information
Agency. He has been appointed not only by republican but also
democratic presidents to senior positions and most recently was
the legal counsel for the United States Navy, the chief legal and
ethical officer of the United States Navy and Marine Corps.
In both the capacity held by Mr. Mora and by Mr. Taft, I
think that you will very quickly see not only was theirs a very
important supervisory role but it was an important role for the
development of policy and the advocacy of law in government.
It is a pleasure to welcome all of you. Thank you very much for
coming. Today's discussion is meant to be among three
specialists. My role is to help create a platform for that
discussion and occasionally to spin the wheel faster and
814
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encourage them to engage one another in this discourse.
Toward that end I would like to raise a few points and then I will
be quiet and ask Mr. Mora to begin.
The role of intelligence and policy especially in war and
diplomacy is now very acutely known to the American public,
but it has always been important. One of the most important
questions for us is how do we learn from our own mistakes and
how do we learn from the past? We are fixed now in an
engagement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in countries across the
world seeking knowledge that will allow us not only to defend
ourselves, but to project the type of security for American
interests, liberty, and values across the world. This has never
not been true and I would like to offer two quick stories as
contrast.
In the beginning of the Vietnam War most of you will
remember the Gulf of Tonkin incident in which there was a
belief, based upon military intelligence and military operations,
that a naval group of two American destroyers, the Maddox and
the Turner Joy, had been attacked. An insufficient evaluation of
that intelligence and a rush to use it lead to the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, which significantly escalated the American presence
in Vietnam and led to quite a few continuing problems for the
country from that stage forward.
It is now widely acknowledged that there were severe
problems with that analysis and indeed, the second of the two
attacks, the one that was considered the greater problem and the
basis for the resolution, may well never have happened. It is not
always the case, however, that American intelligence makes
mistakes. It is often the polity. Many of you are aware of the
destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana,
Cuba in January 1898, when it was believed by many that the
Maine may have been sunk by Spanish revolutionaries and the
then colony of Cuba. A very careful and a very swift evaluation
was conducted under, I suppose, the U.S. Naval intelligence at
the time and the Department of the Navy. The recommendation
to President McKinley was that there was insufficient evidence
to determine the exact cause of the destruction despite it being
such a horrible loss of life and, therefore, it did not serve as the
casus belli leading to the Spanish-American war, because of
careful evaluation by intelligence professionals.
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Now, the question is not only about intelligence, the
question is about law. In the midst of all the problems that we
have seen in trying to determine the truth of the matter and to
determine how our enemies might behave, law can provide two
different forms of assistance. First, law can help set the rules of
the game. Law can tell us what agents of the State may do.
There will be much discussion about what amounts to torture
and whether it may be used. There will be much discussion of
other types of activity that we would like to think do now
resonate with American values. Law may set the rules of the
game and enforcement of those rules may be very valuable, not
only externally through the courts, but also internally by the
very, very well-trained professional staff that incorporates those
laws into their practices.
Additionally, besides the rules of the game, law may
provide the map board for the game itself. Law may draw the
squares upon which the maps are played out. Law can
determine whether or not intelligence can be given directly to
elected officials. Law can determine the types of analysis. Law
can determine what forms of evaluation are required and indeed
must be used before policy and other decisions of State may be
based upon it. I think we are all aware that there were flaws in
intelligence handling in the recent decisions regarding Iraq. To
determine what we've learned from those, to look to the future,
to try and both protect ourselves and our values and to do it in a
way that we believe is going to be, in the long-term, how we
wish to see ourselves; that surely can be the province of law.
And lastly, the question of democracy-what is it that we
the people must demand? Can we rely upon statements of truth
from which we cannot find a rationale because the source of the
rationale is a secret, yet we must respect some secrets or we can
never learn new secrets? These are the questions that these men
have grappled with throughout their professional lives and
careers and they have, I can say with great, great confidence,
much to say. I will now be quiet and ask them to say it. It's my
pleasure now to introduce again Mr. Mora.
MR. MORA: Stephen asked me to start my presentation
with a discussion of the personal circumstances that led to my
involvement in some of the issues that are the topic of today's
panel. Before starting to do so, let me say how honored I am to
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be here today at the University of Arkansas. It's always a
pleasure to be here and I count many of your law school
graduates among my colleagues at Wal-Mart and can attest to
the fact that it is an excellent law school producing excellent
graduates and lawyers.
Let me also indicate that it's an honor to be here with Lord
Butler and Will Taft. Lord Butler's relationship with me is only
less than a day old, but Will Taft I've known for a long time.
And I've had occasions in other settings to describe him as
possessing one of the most distinguished resumes of public
service in our generation, and I'll repeat that characterization
today. If you take trouble to see all the responsibilities and
positions he has held in the U.S. government over a course of
many years, you'll recognize that to be a conservative statement
of his achievements. And I'm also glad to be here with Steve
Sheppard. Both I learn from him and I always have a good time
in Steve's presence, all the more reason to be here.
I will now turn to the vast issues of intelligence, law and
democracy, which I want to introduce with this vignette. I was
serving as general counsel of the Department of the Navy when
late one afternoon, into my Pentagon office walked the director
of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, an organization that
falls under the responsibilities of the Navy General Counsel.
Director Brant said that his agents down in Guantanamo were
hearing rumors that detainees were being abused.
He let that sink in and then he asked the question, "Would
you like to learn more?" The subtext of that question was, "or is
this too hot; would you rather that we not go further down this
path?" Well, my response was that I needed to learn more. And
he said, "Very well, why don't I come back tomorrow with
some of my colleagues and let you know what we know."
The next day Director Brant came back with his chief
psychologist who plays an important role in NCIS applying the
tools of psychology to the problems of law enforcement and
national security, and two other senior agents. Although they
had not witnessed this themselves, because NCIS is not involved
in these interrogation exercises, they had heard that harsh
interrogation techniques were being applied to certain detainees
at Guantanamo. Guantanamo is a small enough place that such
817
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things could be heard at the mess hall and at the athletic and
recreational facilities.
Director Brant then indicated that abusive treatment was
taking place. In fact, they provided fragments of transcripts of
interrogations that demonstrated abusive treatment. They
further indicated that they were concerned that these techniques
may have already violated American law. They felt that there
was the possibility, even the probability, a phenomenon known
as force creep could occur, if not checked. This phenomenon is
one in which interrogators applying force in an interrogation get
frustrated and then, because they're already applying force and
they think that if the application of one time force is good, then
perhaps two times force is twice as good, and so on and so forth.
This apparently is an established phenomenon documented in
the psychological literature. They were afraid that unless
forestalled this could be manifesting itself in Guantanamo as
well. In the view of the NCIS agents the techniques they were
hearing about were unlawful, unethical, unprofessional, un-
American-contrary to all our values and a potential disaster for
American military and foreign policy.
Then they turn to me, and of course, the ball is now in my
court. What do I do in this circumstance? I'll leave it to you
because I think this is one of the questions that all of us who are
lawyers or who will become lawyers need to think about. These
issues will come up in the course of your professional careers,
perhaps not in the exact same setting but in analogous settings
and one needs to think about these things ahead of time.
My response, which led to a series of events that continues
almost without interruption to this day, was to involve myself
precisely in the question of what place, if any, does cruelty have
in American life, in American foreign policy, in American law,
and in American values. To my surprise, this is a question of
such a vastness that it does not have a simple answer. I expected
there to be a very easy answer to this kind of question, but in
point of fact it's not easy. It's led me into an exploration of the
underlying philosophical purposes of the law.
What is the philosophy of law; what ends does law serve
and what is the relationship between law and values? For
example, one of the dilemmas I faced as general counsel-what
does one do in a situation where the President has indicated that
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the Geneva Conventions do not apply to a certain class of
detainees? And if you do the research, you'll find that if you
take Geneva out of the equation, and then you examine the body
of law that applies to detainees held outside of the American
jurisdiction, you'll find that the answer is not automatically easy
to find. Then there are other issues and questions that then arise
in concentric circles once those central questions are posed.
But leaving aside the anecdotes, let me then turn to the
points I would like to make. I will be addressing the issue of
cruelty. What role should cruelty have in American values, law,
foreign policy, and national security policy? I'll come to a
judgment on this, but let me start with certain initial
assumptions. The first assumption is that the threat that the
United States faces is very, very real. To anyone out there who
believes that the threat is exaggerated or overblown, or only of
historical fact, no longer a present danger (meaning that 9/11
occurred and that since there have been no further attacks we're
no longer facing the threat that we had once faced) let me
suggest to you that that it is not a safe assumption.
My belief is that the threat continues. My belief is that
there will be other terrorist attacks against the United States. I
always think in this context of a statement that my former boss,
the Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, now the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, makes in some of his presentations. He
says he's figured out why the terrorists killed three thousand
Americans on 9/11. He says it's very easy. The reason they
killed three thousand Americans is because they couldn't figure
out how to kill three million.
I don't think that's an exaggeration. I think there are
individuals out there who are at this moment attempting to
devise ways to kill Americans in quantity, industrial quantities.
These are individuals who, if they could, would purchase or
acquire the loose nuclear weapon; who would, if they could,
develop or purchase biological weapons of mass destruction or
chemical weapons of mass destruction and employ them as
easily as you or I cross the street. To them the issue of killing
those we would classify as innocent Americans (they would see
that as an oxymoron) is not a moral issue at all. In fact, a
number of these terrorist leaders, including Osama bin Laden,
have stated that, in fact, it is an ethical obligation to kill
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Americans. I think that the threat is real and significant and will
be a persistent threat for the foreseeable future, so my comments
as I make them in my analysis and recommendations should not
be considered in the context of downplaying the dimensions of
this threat.
Second of all, the importance of intelligence cannot be
overstated. In this kind of war, intelligence is at the heart of
both successful defensive and successful offensive military
operations. In fact, in this context it's interesting to reflect, as I
heard said at the Pentagon, that the nature of war has changed in
the last decade. For all of human history, war was classified by
the following equation, and the equation goes that it was very
easy to find the enemy because, of course, they massed. In
World War I, World War II, and the Korean War you would
have masses of troops, large fleets, and large air formations.
You knew where they were more or less, and they were visible
through a fairly rudimentary reconnaissance; but the other half
of the equation is that it was hard to kill the enemy, so easy to
find, yet hard to kill.
Well, since the revolution in military warfare that has been
caused by the adoption of precision munitions by the United
States and its leading allies, the equation is reversed. Now it's
very easy for the United States and other allies to kill the enemy.
It's extremely easy for the United States, once the location of an
enemy is identified, to dispose of him, but now it's hard to find
them. With these assumptions in mind, I am of the opinion that
the decision to apply cruelty rested on four false legal and policy
assumptions or judgments. The first is that the unlawful
combatants are not protected by the law and have no rights.
Because the Geneva Conventions do apply, the detainees did
have rights that attached and U.S. maltreatment was proscribed.
I think that even unlawful combatants who may have committed
the most unspeakable acts possess certain rights even when in
captivity outside of U.S. territory.
The second false assumption is that the application of
cruelty would not adversely affect our legal regime, our foreign
policy interests, and our national security interests; meaning that
we could apply cruelty without adverse impact to these other
considerations or these other structures in our society. The third
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false assumption is that unless cruelty were applied, more
Americans and perhaps even many more Americans would die.
The last of the four assumptions is that if the American
public or international publics learned that cruelty was being
applied to these detainees, or if it was disclosed that this policy
was in effect, no one would care. Such was the resolve of the
American people, such was the nature of the threat, such was the
obvious compelling rationale for the application of cruelty that
the American public en masse would be of one mind that this, of
course, was the right thing and necessary thing to do. These
were the four assumptions that underlie the adoption of a policy
of cruelty.
Now, I think that each of these assumptions is incorrect,
each one of them. I think Americans care whether we apply
cruelty or not. I think that there are laws that prohibit the
application of cruelty and I think there are rights that protect
individuals who might be the victims of cruelty. I think cruelty
is not necessary to protect American lives. In fact, I think it
weakens our defenses. I think there are adverse effects to our
system of laws, to our values, to our foreign policy and to our
national security with the adoption of cruelty. Let me say just a
few more points before wrapping up.
Most of the analysis and most of the discussion on this
issue centers on the legality and ethics of cruelty. That really is
the starting point of any of this analysis. One of the lessons that
I learned, as I thought through these issues in the months and
years after that initial event, is that it really all comes down to a
basic principle. It really all comes down to the value that one
attaches to the protection of individual dignity.
If you believe, as I do, that the protection of individual
dignity is the organizing principle of our country and democratic
societies, then you need to ask what the violation of this
principle would mean for our foreign policy and national
security interests. Let's analyze this as a matter of policy. As a
matter of policy the question becomes: does a policy of cruelty
support or not support our overarching foreign policy objectives
and our overarching national security interests?
My answer to this question is overwhelmingly, no. Cruelty
weakens the United States and has weakened the United States.
Cruelty makes us less safe and not stronger. This is the main
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point I would leave you with today-thinking about the
purposes of this colloquium, my personal objective would be to
disabuse anybody who thinks that we are safer if we adopt
another tool in our defensive arsenal, the use of cruelty in
interrogation.
Let me just outline very briefly the reasons why this is so.
Going back to the law, I think cruelty is ultimately destructive of
our legal system because cruelty is destructive of the underlying
philosophical principles upon which we are based. We can
never contain the application of cruelty to areas outside of
America's borders. It will infect the domestic legal environment
and undermine our constitutional foundations. With respect to
American foreign policy, since World War II, you'll see that the
overriding objective has been the creation of international
institutions, values, and rules that promote human dignity
shielded by the rule of law. In fact, we have fought for these
objectives in the last five decades.
After World War II, the Geneva Conventions were
established,1 the United Nations was organized,2 and the UN
Charter was adopted.3 We built all the multilateral financial
institutions. We strengthened the West, in fact, we created a
community of Western nations all sharing the same values. We
developed a foreign policy that more or less consciously is based
upon the rule of law dedicated to the protection of human rights.
We've been so successful in organizing and achieving that kind
of objective, so much so that the prohibition against cruelty is
now an institutional part of the law of every European
democracy and, in fact, of all our traditional allies. I would
include Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in this group.
The application of cruelty in each of those countries would
be a criminal act under their jurisdictions. Consequently, when
the United States adopted a policy of cruelty and we asked
leaders like Tony Blair to ally with us in the war on terror, we
were potentially asking leaders and lower ranking officials in
1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
2. See History of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory (last
visited Jan. 2, 2008).
3. See History of the Charter of the United Nations: The United Nations Declaration,
http://www.un.org/aboumn/ charter/history/declaration.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
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these governments to aid and abet in the commission of criminal
acts under their legislation. Those countries can't follow us in
that direction, and if we're thinking correctly we would not want
them to follow this lead.
Now, what are the foreign policy consequences? The
immediate foreign policy consequence is that the United States
would never be able to build and sustain the alliance necessary
to fight a war on terror effectively. If Afghanistan and Iraq and
the war on terror more generally have taught us anything
operationally, it is that the going-alone policy is not an effective
war fighting strategy. As a matter of strategy, we wish to build
a long, durable, and broad coalition of like-minded nations to
fight this war together with us. There's really no other way to
find and detect these dispersed terrorists who are scattered
throughout multiple jurisdictions.
Now, this is why it doesn't work as a security policy. If
you analyze the impact operationally of these policies of cruelty
what you will see is that there's been a distancing of these
traditional allies from us during the course of this war for the
reasons I mentioned. They could not, as a matter of law,
politics, or policy accompany us into the swamp of cruelty. It's
not a choice that those societies are prepared to make.
Let me leave you with two last thoughts-the German
Constitution, Section one, Article one, provides that the
protection of human dignity, and I'm paraphrasing, is the
principal function of the State.4 It is the duty of all public
organizations of the German State to advance this principle.
5
Now, when one reflects on this fact, that the German State, the
state responsible for the two catastrophic wars of the 20th
century should now have adopted this policy, one realizes that
this is, in and of itself, a significant fact. It is significant, and
credit goes to the German nations and citizens that it is an
element of their Constitution today. They are the ones who
deserve the credit, but the fact that this element to the
Constitution was adopted in 1949 when the United States and its
allies had control over the totality of Germany reflects credit on
4. Grundgesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] May
23, 1949, art. 1, § 1.
5. See Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution]
May 23, 1949, art. 1, § 1.
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the enlightened statecraft of the United States, Great Britain, and
the other allies in the war on terror.
This represents the operational pursuit of a human-rights
policy as a principal objective of our foreign policy. It has been
an overarching operational foreign-policy principle for the last
five or six decades and has yielded enormous benefits for our
country. It's created a system of rules and institutions which
protect the United States, that make us safer, not weaker. If we
abandon this concept-as we necessarily must if we adopt a
policy of cruelty-we start dismantling not only our values, but
we start dismantling the architecture of foreign policy and
national security which we have built up during these last
decades. That will not make us safer. That is a dead end from
which the United States must retreat.
Let me close, with a tribute to Professor Waldron 6 who
made an observation about cruelty and the law that I think is so
central to our discussion. Because what I hope I've touched on
is the fact that there is an interrelationship between values, laws,
foreign policy and national security; all are interconnected. The
application of cruelty cannot be restricted to only one section
without having impact on the others, but this is where it starts.
Professor Waldron talks about the principle of non-brutality and
he writes:
Law is not savage, law does not rule through abject fear and
terror, or by breaking the will of those whom it confronts ....
There [is] an enduring connection between the spirit of the law
and respect for human dignity-respect for human dignity even
in extremis, where law is at its most forceful and its subjects at
their most vulnerable .... [T]he rule against torture functions as
an archetype of this very general policy. It is vividly emblematic
of our determination to sever the link between the law and
brutality, between the law and terror, and between the law and the
enterprise of breaking a person's will.
7
I think that sums up my fundamental position on this issue.
6. Professor Jeremy Waldron is a University Professor at New York University
School of Law. He was originally scheduled to moderate this lecture program. Professor
Waldron was unable to attend due to disruption in travel plans.
7. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,
105 COLUM. L. REv. 1681, 1726-27 (2005).
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MR. TAFT: Thank you, Steve. I'm delighted also to be
here as part of this group and to see Alberto again. As he's
mentioned, we've worked together for some years and also to
get to know Lord Butler. And I also want to compliment the
University and the Law School for putting on this type of forum
and sponsoring this discussion.
Alberto I think has spoken extremely well and I find very
little to disagree with in what he has said and I don't want to
repeat it. So what I thought I would do is to focus just on two
questions, one of which he did touch on but the other one, not so
much. They were questions that were raised in the beginning of
the discussion. The first question was whether there are tools
that should be illegal in the gathering of intelligence, one of
which certainly would be torture or in a milder form, perhaps,
cruelty. And the second question was what obligation, and it's
really a different type of question focusing more on intelligence,
what obligation should there be on officials in a democracy to
disclose the basis of intelligence that is used and which it is said
supports or requires that the government take military action?
On the first question, are there some tools that should not
be used in gathering intelligence? We must consider this
question in light of the absolute necessity, more important now
than previously, that we must gather intelligence if our security
is to be preserved and if we are to be successful in frustrating
those people who want to do us no end of harm. So given their
intention, one must be very cautious in laying limits to what can
be done and what we would permit or prohibit in the gathering
of intelligence. But just to take on torture and cruelty, my own
view first on the legal point, is that torture and cruelty are
prohibited by legal instruments to which the United States is a
party-torture specifically by the Convention against Torture,
8
and cruelty by common article three in the Geneva Conventions,
which the Supreme Court has determined is applicable to any of
the persons that we might take into custody in the war with the
terrorists. 9
In a way then, it is possible to say we have resolved this
issue, at least as a matter of law. We have signed up as the rest
8. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
9. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794 (2006).
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of the world has done, and these two conventions, or the four
Geneva Conventions and the Convention against Torture are
virtually universally adhered to, or at least subscribed to, and
they do prohibit both of these forms of interrogation. It's also
fair to say that torture is itself-it's beneath our values and
inconsistent with our values even if we had not undertaken the
obligations in the convention on torture. And I think it's fair to
say that before we became a party to the Convention against
Torture that we already had proscribed it as a tool in gathering
intelligence.
It is also, I think, not a reliable way of obtaining
intelligence. Unfortunately, there isn't any way to prove this.
Now, I am aware that people say that the methods of
interrogation which were certainly coercive, and which I and
many others would have said amounted to torture, have
produced valuable intelligence which has saved American lives,
perhaps many American lives. This, however, is unfortunately
not something that is subject to direct proof, but even if it were
true, the problem with the proposition is that you can't do it both
ways. You can't torture a person and also not torture the same
person and know what intelligence would be produced by not
torturing. The fact is that over the years under the policies the
Department of Defense has had in place, and they did not
include torture as prescribed in the manuals governing the
conduct of our forces, a great deal of very valuable intelligence
has been obtained from people in custody. And it would be easy
to say that a great deal of intelligence has been obtained which
has saved American lives and, therefore, that is the way that you
should be conducting your interrogations.
So while it's hard to deny, not knowing what is being relied
upon or stated, that perhaps a person subject to torture or cruelty
has provided important intelligence information, other methods
also have the same track record. For that reason it's not possible
to say that torture is the valid approach.
There are, of course, issues as to what is torture and as
Alberto suggested, even issues as to what is cruelty. I do think it
is important to recall that the idea that you cannot use coercive
methods of interrogation does not mean that you can't ask very
tough questions. A cross-examination can be extremely
rigorous, and a procedure which is not comfortable for the
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witness, but I don't think anybody would say that it is torture. It
is a perfectly legitimate method-vigorous interrogation, the use
of deception, saying that you know things that you don't know
and asserting them hoping that the man that you're interrogating
will either confirm them or deny them, are perfectly legitimate
forms of interrogation. It's not torture, but it's not exactly what
I guess Lord Butler would call cricket either. It is deceptive, but
it is certainly a legitimate method of intelligence gathering and
has been a very useful one over the years. So we should bear in
mind that there are many ways in which one can obtain
information that are well short of torture and well within the
pale of what is permitted and has always been permitted by the
Army Field Manual.
Another aspect of this, of course, is not just thinking about
whether tools such as torture should be illegal, but there are
other tools which in themselves are not exactly directed at a
specific individual in an interrogation scenario but which,
because of the way that they function, have the risk of intruding
on privacy of individuals and basically interfere with civil
liberties which we view as a basic part of our society. And
we're going through right now, a review of the extent to which
we would permit wiretapping or interception of
communications. I guess wiretapping is too old-fashioned now
in a wireless age, but that's the interception of communications
of American citizens in the United States, and this would be a
considerable infringement of what we have been accustomed to
have as our civil liberties. On the other hand it would yield,
could yield, certainly very valuable intelligence.
In this area I must say that it is entirely possible that we
should have a rebalancing of our practices from what they have
been, in view of certain developments in technology which give
us capabilities to intercept important intelligence and in view of
the value of that intelligence and the need for it. The one point
that I would make in saying this, that I think is important, is that
it should be known what these trade-offs are and it should not
just be done in secret and kept a secret, at least not from the
Congress. It should also be done under judicial supervision.
Obviously I'm referring here to our discussion of the Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Act,'0 which the administration has
suggested is inadequate to allow for the gathering of crucial
intelligence. And all I would say about that is I think that the
Act itself is a balancing and it may be that in this day and age
when it is now possible and when the stakes are extremely high
we might want to balance it in a slightly different way. I think
that the American people over the last four or five years have
indicated that they will-not because they're in favor of cruelty,
they have not said that at all, but they have indicated that they
will tolerate a significant amount of inconvenience, intrusion
into their privacy, and intrusion into what have been previously
civil liberties that they have enjoyed, if it can enhance their
security in this time of very serious threat. These are issues that
I say should be balanced by the legislature and should be carried
out under the supervision of the judiciary. But it's not clear to
me that we should rule out that a rebalancing of the law in that
area might be a good idea and might be something that the
citizens of the United States would welcome in view of the
benefits to be had.
The second area that I mentioned is the question of when
officials have intelligence information which suggests to them
that they need to take action of a military sort to assure and to
protect our security-what is their duty to disclose, or should
there be a duty to disclose that information publicly? If not
publicly disclosed, should they disclose to at least some portion
of the government? My own view is that there is no requirement
to disclose intelligence that the administration, the government
might feel it has to use, or that suggests the need to take military
action. If on balance, it feels that the disclosure of that
information would either jeopardize its ability to defend against
the threat that it is aware of, or in some other way be too costly
because it would expose sources and methods of gathering
intelligence in a way that would prevent us in the future from
getting intelligence that we need, it should be able to keep the
information from the public where terrorists would become
aware of it.
The main downside of disclosing such information
obviously is that we would expose our sources and methods. On
10. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (2000).
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the other side we should have in mind the benefit of disclosure
to the public, which is that over time any military action that we
undertake will require continuing support not just within the
government but from the public at large. If you simply tell the
public at the beginning that there is intelligence which requires
us to take this action and leave it at that, you will not give
yourself as much of a chance of getting that public support as if
you are able to and feel that you should disclose a little more of
the basis for your conclusion that you need to take that action.
The public will probably go with you for a while, but wars tend
sometimes to go on longer than people anticipate and they're not
always going well, in fact, most wars at some point don't go
well. They may go well at the end, but public support is needed
throughout. When you decide not to disclose to the public the
basis for your analysis of the threat you face, you risk losing that
support.
Now, there is an intermediate ground-in our system where
we have three branches of government, and particularly where
we have in the Congress a coordinate branch of government
which has responsibility for authorizing the use of military
force, what is the responsibility to disclose their intelligence
information or what is the ability to withhold intelligence
information? I would say that it is essential that where a branch
of the government, obviously, I have in mind here the Congress,
does have authority and responsibility for authorizing military
actions it needs to be informed. Now this can be done in
whatever form it decides, and it might decide to do it in a
restricted form of just a few members or a few committees; but
it would be a lot sounder, in a situation where basically you are
asking these people who have been elected to vote and authorize
certain actions, that they should have the basic information that
the executive branch relies on in making these decisions and
should have all of it.
Obviously, the disclosure to the Congress can be on a
confidential basis and there are risks in that, no doubt, but I
think that whatever method the Congress were to determine is
required to carry out its functions is the one that the executive
branch should have to follow. Well, let me just leave it at that-
we will be able to get more deeply into these particular issues,
I'm sure, in the discussion that follows.
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LORD BUTLER: Thank you very much, and can I say
how delighted I am to be here and taking part in this discussion.
I think this sort of discussion, if I may say so, is the sort of thing
that American universities mount absolutely marvelously. I've
already enjoyed the discussions that I've had with Alberto and
Will and indeed I've learned a lot from what they've said this
afternoon, so it is great pleasure to be here and taking part in
this.
They have addressed quite a lot of their remarks to the
question of torture and I agree with what they have said about
that, but lest you should think that we are all in absolute
harmony and that this is an easy question-I want just to put
something that we might come back to in discussion: torture is
wrong; torture is not in our long-term interest; torture is not
consistent with our values. But what do you do if you have
picked up a guy who has placed a nuclear bomb somewhere in
Manhattan which is due to go off in twelve hours time? What do
you do in order to get that information out of them? Are you
justified in those circumstances in taking the sort of measures
that you wouldn't take in any other circumstance? I just raise
this as a classical question; it's not an unfamiliar one. It's in the
textbooks, but what is the answer? I have my answer, but we
might, if we address this question of torture in discussion, just
go back to it.
Now, I really want to talk about the U.K. end of this and I
want to address some of the wider questions, particularly the
ones that Will Taft was addressing at the end of his remarks and
discuss in this age when intelligence is of huge importance. It's
going to be important throughout the lives of this generation that
are now in this University for the reasons that have been given.
It is the principal, in my view, tool of war if there are further
wars in this century and it is the principal tool for countering
terrorism. It is too late when people are already off with the
bombs in their knapsacks. The way in which it's stopped is
through gathering intelligence, so it's going to be very
important.
In those circumstances what I would like to discuss is what
is owed to the citizens in these circumstances, including the
citizens who may be the targets of that intelligence-seeking and
may be, in some cases, wrongly the targets of that intelligence-
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seeking. Let me just put it in context and say a little bit about
the way the intelligence machinery works in the United
Kingdom. We have three main agencies. We have the Secret
Intelligence Service which is, if you like, the opposite number of
the CIA. We have GCHQ which is the interception agency and
which is the opposite number of the NSA, and we have the
Security Service which looks after internal security and is the
opposite number of the FBI. It's not quite as clear as that, but
that is the basic structure.
I was never a member of any of those agencies, but my role
as Cabinet Secretary was to be a link between those agencies
and the politicians, and in particular to the Prime Minister. I
was responsible to Parliament for the expenditure on the
agencies through what we call the secret vote. I was the channel
for conveying intelligence to the Prime Minister and I chaired
the committee which determined the priorities for the use of the
budget of the secret vote by the agencies.
It was a principle of the U.K. system that on the whole we
tried to prevent unprocessed direct access by the agencies to the
politicians. The head of the Secret Intelligence Service and the
head of the Security Service do have direct access to the Prime
Minister. If they exercise that, they're meant to keep the cabinet
secretary in touch with it, but we tried to discourage that direct
access for this reason-we wanted to avoid the sort of situation
which Steve Sheppard referred to in his opening discussions of
the Bay of Tonkin and its part in the lead up to the Vietnam
War.
Intelligence is a dangerous commodity. It is something
which may come from corrupt sources. It may have been placed
with you by the enemy. It may be there to mislead. And during
the second World War, Winston Churchill set up an apparatus in
the U.K. called the Joint Intelligence Committee which was
intended to be an intermediary between the agencies and the
policy makers, the politicians. Our preferred method of
operating is that the intelligence which is gathered by the
agencies, whether it's from intercept, whether it's from agents,
or by whatever means it's discovered, is processed by a
committee which also takes into account the intelligence which
is being obtained by overt means-through diplomatic channels,
the trade channels, or indeed through the media, reading the
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newspapers. The way in which our system works when it has
the opportunity, the time to work this way, is that all these
sources are put into the joint-intelligence committee. The joint-
intelligence committee then processes it, assesses it, and sets one
source of intelligence against another because they may be
saying contradictory or inconsistent things and only on the basis
of that gives a picture, an assessment, to the policy makers and
to the politicians.
We think it is very dangerous for the head of an agency
who has got an exciting bit of intelligence to rush off to a
decision-maker, to a politician, and say "I've got this nugget of
intelligence, it's very exciting, I believe in it, you've got to act,"
because that can lead to some of the classic mistakes that have
been made in history. Of course, on some occasions, let's take
the Manhattan example that I quoted earlier, if you've got a bit
of information like that, you've got to act on it really quickly,
but it isn't the preferable way of handling intelligence.
Now, in an age when intelligence is going to be an
important part of our lives what ought to be the restraints on it?
Under what regimes should it be governed in the interests of our
values, our freedom, and our citizens' rights? In the U.K. all of
this has developed very quickly over the last twenty-five years.
It's extraordinary to think that the very existence of the Secret
Intelligence Service and the Security Service and of GCHQ was
only officially acknowledged by the government in 1981, just
over 25 years ago. Before that their existence were open secrets:
we all knew about them; we all knew about M16; and we knew
about MI5; but government would not acknowledge them. They
would not acknowledge the location of these agencies and they
would not acknowledge their personnel.
You remember from James Bond that it was well known
that the head of the Secret Intelligence Service was called M.
Actually he was called C. Now we are allowed to know what
his real name is. But paradoxically we are not allowed to know
what Ms. Moneypenny's real name is, but since the agencies
were avowed, since their existence was avowed in 1981, we
have passed a whole lot of legislation which defines explicitly
what their powers are and what the rights of the citizens in
relation to them are. We know now where they're all located,
and those of you have seen recent James Bond films will
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remember James Bond coming out in a shiny speedboat out of a
building which is indeed the building of the Secret Intelligence
Service.
Now, I think that this is necessary. I start from the premise
that all acquisition of intelligence is an abuse of human rights. It
is by definition the acquisition of information which the owner
of it does not wish the people who are acquiring it to have. It is,
therefore, an abuse of the human rights of privacy of the people
from whom the information is being obtained. But that human
right to privacy is not an absolute human right. It is qualified
and it must be qualified by the need to set the public interest
against it where the information you're trying to acquire is
information to prevent crime, to prevent terrorism, or is
information which enables you to preserve your national
interests against an enemy.
So it is legitimate to infringe that human right to privacy in
those circumstances. But I think that there must be certain
requirements and the principles that underlie our legislation are
these, that the action which you take in infringing those human
rights must be proportionate. It must be proportionate to the
injury which you're trying to prevent. Second, it must be under
democratic control. It must be under powers that are granted by
a democratic process through Parliament and enshrined by
legislation. Third, it must be subject to democratic
accountability. What I mean by that is that the actions must be
authorized by a member of the executive who is democratically
accountable, in our case one of the ministers who is answerable
to Parliament. Fourth, because in these circumstances you can't
always trust the executive and you can't always get to know
what the executive is doing, it must be monitored by an
authority which is independent of the executive.
In our case, in the case of the Security Service and the
Secret Intelligence Service, there is a judge, a member of the
judiciary who has access to all of the papers, all the decisions of
the agencies and can monitor them to ensure that the action that
is being taken is compliant with the law. That judge is within
the circle of secrecy. It is the way that we try to resolve the
dilemma that the public has a right to know that what the
agencies are doing is consistent with the powers that have been
granted to them by Parliament. But the public can't, for reasons
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of secrecy, know directly what those actions are. So we entrust
a judge as independent of the executive to do that for us.
And finally, there must be a right of appeal by citizens.
You or I, if we feel that we are the victims of the agencies in a
way which goes beyond their powers, must have some form of
redress. Now, how can we do that, because clearly if we say, "I
think my telephone is being tapped, please will you tell me
whether it is," then the agencies aren't going to willingly tell us.
So we have set up tribunals in both the case of the Secret
Intelligence Service and the Security Service and GCHQ to
which any citizen can go and say, "I've heard a click on my
telephone, I think that I may be under surveillance." The answer
that they get is not, "yes, you were under surveillance" or
"you're not under surveillance." The answer is from somebody
who has seen what's going on and has access to all the papers,
that there is nothing going on which is not authorized under the
law.
Now then, that may well be if you're a crook you are being
bugged; but you're being bugged legitimately and in accordance
with the powers. The answer may well be, and I'm glad to say it
hasn't happened yet, there hasn't been an instance of it in the
U.K., "yes, I've discovered that there is an abusive power going
on and you are eligible for redress." So to sum up, the system in
the U.K. to protect the liberty and the rights of citizens are each
agency is governed by a specific law. The powers of the
agencies are defined. They cannot do anything which is not
justified by legislation. The legislation does not cover or
authorize either torture or assassination, and as a matter of
policy these have not been, even before the law was passed,
within the activities of the British intelligence agencies. Every
activity must be warranted. It must be warranted by a Secretary
of State. All these actions have to be monitored by a judge with
full access to the papers and the activities. Every citizen has a
right to appeal.
And finally, there is oversight by a committee of
parliamentarians just like the intelligence committees of
Congress. That in my view, that last thing, is the weakest part of
our system. Because although this is subject to secret hearings
and the members of Parliament do have access, they don't have
the sort of access which I believe your congressional committees
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have, and these are committees of parliamentarians rather than
committees actually within Parliament. I think we're going to
have to go further in that respect of having parliamentary
scrutiny than we have already. So these are the arrangements
which have been put in place in the U.K. in the last twenty-five
years to govern the activities of the intelligence agencies, to
reassure those who may be its victims and the citizens generally
that they act within what is proportionate, what is reasonable,
and that people have a right to know if they are worried that they
may be illegitimately the subject of that investigation.
I think I would like to stop there. We could follow up other
things in discussion.
PROFESSOR SHEPPARD: As to interrogation of suspects
taken abroad and held in a variety of places but especially in
Guantanamo Bay, which at that time was under the province of
the Secretary of the Navy to whom you had special
obligations-how did you come to the position that you would
oppose the White House Counsel? Did that only develop later,
and at what point did you realize that this was an argument, as
opposed to a policy discussion? How did you individually come
to the positions you took in moving forward?
MR. MORA: Steve, there are a couple of incorrect
assumptions there. First of all, the Guantanamo interrogation
operations did not come under the Secretary of the Navy
because they were operational concerns. Although this is a
complex organizational fact, in fact, the Department of the
Navy, like the other departments, is charged only with training,
equipping and organizing the military services. They are no
longer responsible as we were during World War II with
operational matters. So, in fact, the interrogation operations in
Guantanamo were never contracted by the Navy. They were not
authorized by the Department of the Navy. There was no
reporting that came up to the Secretary of the Navy in our chain
of command on this particular issue, so the fact that David Brant
came to me, was something really done outside the ordinary
chain of command or chain of responsibilities.
Now, the second point is that I was not, to be fair, engaged
in the discussion on the Geneva Conventions' applicability. I
became engaged subsequently on the matter of abuse, but this
was only a year after Geneva issues were had. To be frank, I
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initially accepted the analysis that Geneva did not apply to these
unlawful combatants but subsequently, have come to the view
that, in fact, that was a legal mistake. The correct view, as I
think the Supreme Court has indicated and Will has suggested as
others have indicated, that the better view of Geneva is that there
is no person not protected by Geneva on the battlefield, whether
it be a combatant or a civilian. Even if Geneva did not apply,
my view always was that there was an underlying obligation not
to abuse individuals, even without Geneva. So my analysis of
what was going on in Guantanamo was really independent of the
Geneva analysis initially. I presumed that there was a level of
both personal rights and also obligation of the part of the United
States which prohibited the application of cruelty. That would
be the short answer to the question.
MR. TAFT: Well, I guess I should say I was involved in
the discussion which came up around the turn of the year 2001-
2002 as to whether the Geneva Conventions applied and
basically as to the treatment of persons that we were taking into
custody in the conflict with Al Qaeda and with the Taliban.
Our view in the State Department was that the Conventions did
apply to both groups. Subsequently, I came to think that
perhaps they did not apply to A l Qaeda, but I continued to think
that they applied to the Taliban.
The way we in the State Department finessed this issue,
however, was by relying on the statement of the President that
was put out by the press secretary-we would comply even if it
was determined that Geneva did not apply. That was the advice
that the president had been given by the attorney general and
which he was advised was authoritative; I didn't agree with it,
but that was the advice he was given and I can understand why
he would have accepted it. But the President also decided we
would nonetheless comply with the spirit of Geneva and we
relied on that in our thinking. In fact, we wrote an extremely
long memorandum in the Department of State which basically
said what was happening in Guantanamo could be viewed as
complying with our international obligations. Not perhaps
because we thought that we had to comply, but that anybody
who was wondering whether we were complying would find
that that was our intention.
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One of the problems with this, of course, was that we were
not aware that the fact that the President had decided that the
Geneva Conventions did not apply was actually being used to
confuse the understanding of those involved in the operation as
to what did apply, and there wasn't any solid guidance on that
point. Alberto actually has more experience on this than I, but it
developed-it came out subsequently that people were fairly
unsure in the Department of Defense and down in Guantanamo
as to what they could and could not do, and indeed I guess most
dramatically even the Attorney General and the Secretary and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, when they were asked by
members of Congress in public hearings whether they could say
what was permitted and what was not; they said they could not.
This confusion is what led most seriously to the creeping of
conduct there into what ultimately was, in many instances,
clearly unlawful.
But that was our experience and we in the State Department
certainly opposed the decision that was made to depart from
Geneva. It was inconsistent with our practice which, typically,
had been not to bother to figure out whether Geneva applied or
not, but to apply it to anybody we found on the other side of a
conflict. That was what we had done in Vietnam. That was
what we actually told our troops to do when they entered
Afghanistan in October of 2001, and it was a serious mistake not
to continue that policy.
PROFESSOR SHEPPARD: Thank you very much. Lord
Butler, you chaired the Committee of Privy Counsillors which
issued the review on intelligence on weapons of mass
destruction, and I know as a part of that process you and the
other members of the Privy Counsillors Committee engaged in a
very thorough review, not only of the intelligence that was
gathered, but the methods of its analysis. I wondered in that
process, is there anything that in summary fashion you would
say that ought to guide intelligence handling not only by one of
America's most critical allies but by American itself as we look
to the future in trying to figure out how best to take such
information and use it in the best way?
LORD BUTLER: I think that for both the United States
and for Britain the experience of intelligence that led up to war
in Iraq was a disaster. It was a disaster for our intelligence
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agencies. It was used as a part of the base justification for the
war. Since the war, the existence of weapons of mass
destruction when we had complete access to Iraq couldn't be
established, and in general now I think that although one can
never prove a negative, I think it is generally accepted that those
weapons and that justification didn't exist. And so why did it go
so very wrong? Well, I think that there are actually all sorts of
reasons why one has got to have a great deal of sympathy for the
intelligence agencies.
This was about as difficult a case as you could possibly
have and I have never doubted that the conclusion that was
reached by the intelligence communities of the West and was
accepted by the politicians-that Saddam did have chemical and
biological weapons and was trying to develop a nuclear
weapon-I have never doubted that those conclusions were
reached in good faith and were accepted in good faith by the
politicians. So why, if we did get it wrong, did we get it so
wrong? I think this is a textbook really for all intelligence
agencies about the traps that you've got to be aware of. And the
first trap was, of course, that Saddam had a record. He had had
this stuff. He had used it in the Iran-Iraq War and he had used it
against the Marsh Arabs. What reason had he got to get rid of
it? The second thing was that when at the end of the Gulf War,
the United Nations had access to Iraq, they discovered to their
horror that Iraq was a great deal more advanced towards
obtaining a nuclear weapon than any of the intelligence agencies
in the West has supposed, and that was a great shock.
So the first thing that misled people was Saddam had had
the stuff. There was no plausible reason why he should have got
rid of it. The second thing was his behavior at the time when the
United Nations inspectors went into Iraq in the autumn of 2002
led by Hans Blix. There was plenty of evidence that the UN
inspectors would go to a place where they had been told by U.K.
and U.S. intelligence that they might find the stuff and there
would be some demonstration going on which prevented them
from carrying out their searches. They had to go away and they
would come back two or three days later and lo and behold the
stuff wasn't there. And indeed, there was satellite observation.
As the UN inspectors arrived at the front door, there were trucks
going out of the back carrying crates, and so on. So again, that
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was extremely suggestive, that deceptive action on the part of
Saddam that there was something going on.
And then the third, I think, lesson to be learned and why
mistakes were made was that it's very easy to assume that your
adversary will behave with the same logic and by the same
rationale that you yourself behave. It does really defy credibility
that with the U.S. and the U.K. massing on Iraq's borders, forces
that he had no realistic chance of resisting, he should continue to
behave in a way that suggested that he had these weapons. Why
didn't he just come out with his hands up and say, "For God's
sake, I haven't got them, come in and look, I haven't got them?"
Of course, the reasons may be, you know, difficult for us to
understand; reasons of face, reasons of internal credibility,
credibility with your neighbors. But I think we all found it
difficult to understand that reasoning.
The fourth thing is that I think that the agencies were
misled by their earlier mistakes. I mentioned earlier it had been
a shock at the end of the first Gulf War to find out that Iraq was
nearer having a nuclear weapon than any of us had supposed and
the intelligence agencies didn't want to be caught again. It's
very natural. Similarly, when Saddam Hussein's son-in-law,
Kamel Hussein, defected in the mid-1990s, he brought
information that Iraq had a very much more advanced biological
weapons program than anybody had supposed. They didn't
want to be caught out.
And that leads on to the fifth thing which is that the risks of
underestimating the potential of the enemy are greater than the
risk of overestimating it. You know, if you're an intelligence
agency, you're advising your troops on what they need to do if
they are conducting military operations against Iraq. If you're
going to err, you want to err on the side of overestimating the
enemy's capacity rather than underestimating it.
The sixth thing which actually did happen in the case of
Iraq is very interesting, very interesting to me. The intelligence
agencies, particularly the U.K. intelligence agencies, and they
gave this to Hans Blix, had a figure of chemical agent that was
unaccounted for at the end of the first Gulf War. They could
find no record or any proof that this had been destroyed. They,
therefore, assumed that it was there and was hidden. But when
people came to look at it after the Gulf War what they worked
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out was this hadn't been a fact, the assessment of the chemical
agent that Saddam possessed. It had been an estimate and it was
an estimate based on what would have been the amount of
chemical agent that was there if Saddam had gone on producing
it at the rate that he was producing it at the end of the Iran-Iraq
War, for three years. So it was a deduction drawn from a
hypothesis, but nobody questioned whether maybe the
hypothesis could have been wrong.
The seventh thing, again familiar to all of us, that many of
the sources, the human sources, that our Secret Intelligence
Service used had agendas of their own, although I think in the
case of our intelligence services we did avoid the 6migr~s, the
most obvious sources. Nonetheless, many of the people who did
give evidence had motives for deception which we didn't get
around to.
Another thing famous was group-think, and this is a great
danger for intelligence agencies and exists even between the
U.K. and the U.S. We're close intelligence partners, but there is
always a tendency for intelligence agencies to say, for example,
our Secret Intelligence Service, "the CIA think that Saddam has
got this stuff. Maybe they know something that we don't
know." Maybe, you know, they've got a source that is too
sensitive. I think people thought the same about Mossad, about
the Israeli Intelligence Agency, and so intelligence agencies,
however close their partnership, will always think that if others
have reached the conclusion maybe they know something which
they themselves don't know and that is a reason.
And then finally things that have been well argued; the
pressure of time, the political pressure, and the protection of
sources. Certainly in one case in the U.K. a source that was
extremely influential was one that was thought so secret that the
report couldn't be made available to the agencies within the
Ministry of Defence who are real experts on the subject. When
they saw it after the war they said, "We could have seen through
that." It was only shown to the most senior people who were not
the most expert people. I think all these are lessons which
emerge from the experience over Iraq and which I'm quite sure
our intelligence agencies, both British and the American, will be
learning from the experience.
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PROFESSOR SHEPPARD: In what circumstances does it
work to have a court or a tribunal within the military or within
the intelligence community and in what circumstances must
there be a judge that is outside the intelligence community in
order to assess those things that have to happen in intelligence?
The military-commission question, of course, deals with
violations of law of war, but assuming there is a lawful
boundary around the gathering of intelligence who must assess
this? We obviously have to look at the FISA court again and re-
look at this balance, but who should hold the balance, who
should hold the fulcrum? Can it be done within an agency or
must it be done with external oversight?
LORD BUTLER: Can I just start on that because as it were
I answered it from the U.K. point of view before? We believe it
has to be a judge.
PROFESSOR SHEPPARD: Right.
LORD BUTLER: I don't know what the U.S. system is
and I don't know whether a judge doing this would command
confidence in the U.S. system.
MR. TAFT: Let me first of all on the military commission
say that I do not have paternity in that instance. They were
established in November of 2001 by the President's order 1'
which I was completely unaware was going to be issued at the
time and had nothing to do with. Actually neither the Secretary
of State nor the National Security Advisor were aware that the
order was established and was going to be issued until after it
happened, which was extremely unusual and odd, but that was
the case.
MR. MORA: I should chip in on this point. The military
services likewise were not involved. This came as a complete
surprise to us as well. So it's probably less surprising that the
civilian general counsel was not involved, but it's much more
surprising that the military JAGs, who are the senior uniform
military lawyers, were not consulted within our individual
services either.
MR. TAFT: But as to the question of who or what-how
we institutionally guard the guards, I think in our system the
Congress is the place to look to for this type of supervision.
11. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment and Tnal of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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Structurally it should work better than in some instances it has.
These committees are not partisan. They have the same number
of persons on them from each party, which is true regardless of
who holds the majority of the case. Now, the Senate gets
chairman and a co-chairman, in fact, and in the House not quite
that, but they should be able to provide the supervision and
monitoring that will keep the executive in check.
Unlike in the British system, our Congress is a complete,
separate coordinate branch and not accountable to the executive
and not run by the executive, so it is independent and it ought to
be fully informed, ought to insist that it be fully informed on
these matters. And I think it's a better system than relying on
the judiciary. I'm not very comfortable, and I don't think the
judges are terribly comfortable with operating in the dark, which
is necessary. The judiciary, they did do it under the FISA act,
but I don't think they like it. If you can get it done by
congressional oversight and monitoring, which should be
possible, that seems to me the better way to go.
MR. MORA: If I could say a couple things about the
military commissions because, as everybody knows, they've not
been successful. Five years after their design they've not really
had a full-blown trial, and it's not clear that they ever will. It's
clear also that holding a trial under the current rules probably
would be seen by history as an unmitigated national disaster
because few people will accept the outcomes.
Obviously, the proof is in the pudding which has been the
administration's argument to the courts. Let us have one of
these commissions and then you can judge it based upon the full
record. But not many people are buying this, and it highlights a
couple of aspects about the commissions. First of all, the
commissions highlight that there is an interrelationship between
law and policy. In my experience in government, the American
government hasn't done a good job of understanding the policy
implications of legal decisions. This is particularly true in this
war on terror. If you look at the architects of the military
commissions who made the legal decisions, they were almost all
lawyers and there were very few people who applied a broad
policy analysis to these kinds of decisions.
So what happened? Well, internationally the world has
changed since 1945 and the United States' concepts of justice
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have also changed since 1945. If you were an administration
lawyer bent on establishing a system of military commissions,
you would find ample Supreme Court precedent, starting with
Eisentrager,12 that would say: the Supreme Court has approved
this and it's likely to approve it again, so let's go forward with
the commissions. But this was the system of due process or the
concepts of due process that were applicable back in 1945, not
necessarily the concepts of due process that most courts and
most citizens would find applicable or just today. And if that's
true of the United States, it's also true of European systems for a
number of reasons including, for example, the fact that Geneva
has implications for due process, and European countries are
now applying modem concepts of due process. So military
commissions never found favor with the European allies and this
caused, along with the application of cruelty, yet another factor
leading to a divide between the United States and Europe on
what proved to be strategic aspects of the war on terror.
The absence of a common legal architecture between
ourselves and the Europeans has been a strategic impediment to
the successful prosecution of the war, as a matter of fact. This
was not recognized and I think is still imperfectly recognized
today by the administration. What happens here is that most
lawyers have never been involved in the policy world and have
no understanding what the foreign-policy implications of these
decisions may be. By the same token, most policy makers tend
to be mesmerized by the suggestion that an issue is a legal issue
and then they tend to take their hands off of it and leave it to the
lawyers to decide. Well, both sides are acting with incomplete
understanding of the relevant facts and this can lead to a poorly
thought out decision.
And what also wasn't recognized by the architects of the
commissions is that the American legal system is a unitary
whole-we can't be unjust or be perceived to be unjust in our
conduct of military law, and not have it implicate the rest of our
legal system. It's a judgment that's rendered against all of
American justice. It creates these kinds of political tension and
even political dissent within the system, which touches on the
point that Will touched earlier, it tends to undermine the all-
12. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)
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important political support for the war, particularly in a complex
war like this one.
PROFESSOR SHEPPARD: Given the hour, I think we
have time for one more question, and I'm going to take Lord
Butler's question of the New York bomber with a nuclear bomb
set to go off in twelve hours and I'm going to tweak it in just
one way. We have seen some measure of agreement that torture
particularly, and even its slightly broader incarnation as a policy,
has grave implications to the United States. The idea of a policy
of cruelty is very dangerous and, therefore, one might presume
that even in the face of such a threat that there might be a good
prohibition against the use of cruelty or torture in order to
discern the location of a twelve-hour bomb. But let me ask
you-what ought the law to be and how should we deal with the
agent who has found the suspect? The agent believes that the
suspect has knowledge of a nuclear bomb to go off in twelve
hours and what is the answer if the agent is right and there is
such a bomb and this person does know? What is the answer if
the agent is wrong, believing it truly? Is there a difference
between these two cases?
MR. MORA: From the very first moment, I've always held
the position that, in that kind of ticking bomb scenario, applying
torture to the suspect may not be immoral but certainly must be
illegal, and continues to be illegal. And the reason I say that is
because in thinking through this scenario and other scenarios
over the years it became impossible for me to find the threshold
at which I would say, okay, from now on it clearly is immoral to
apply the cruelty or the torture. In the New York hypothetical,
perhaps 200,000 lives are saved. But who is to say that doing
the same thing for 100,000, or 1000, or 50, or 10, or even one,
would not be equally morally justifiable. And because it struck
me that I couldn't find a break point on where to stop the torture,
there would be an instantaneous race to the bottom.
Instantaneously you would authorize the application of
torture in almost all cases because you can always make the
utilitarian argument. In fact, this kind of ticking bomb scenario
is present every day in Iraq. If you're a platoon leader and had
two of your soldiers killed yesterday and you apprehended today
somebody in the bomb ring, you understand that eliciting
information from the detainee could save two more soldiers
844
2008] INTELLIGENCE, LAW, & DEMOCRACY
tomorrow. What should distinguish that scenario from a
utilitarian standpoint from the larger scenario? So you could
easily see a situation where torture is always authorized and that
can't be the right answer for our civilization.
MR. TAFT: I come out, I think, in the same place. My
view would be not to stress this question or subject. When you
get in that situation, you would obviously have to make a
determination. I would leave it until I was actually there, that it
is unlawful, that torture is prohibited. This is exactly what we
signed up to already, in fact. We resolved this question in
signing up to the Convention against Torture and I would just
say that is our view.
Now, whether we would continue to maintain that view at
the time, I don't know. The French, of course, have a passion
for completeness in theories that would perhaps make them
happy to address this subject. But in our jurisprudence we tend
not to try to nail down every nook and cranny in theory
beforehand. I would follow that practice here except leaving the
possibility that we might answer the question differently than we
answer it now. But our answer now is we don't do it.
LORD BUTLER: I have agonized over this question and I
think I come out where Alberto is. I have an analogy and I don't
know whether other members of the panel will think that it's a
suitable analogy. Let us suppose we've got this person and we
have very good reason to think that he does know where there is
a nuclear bomb that is about -to go. I think in those
circumstances you're entitled to use any effective means within
your power to discover where the location of the bomb,
including torture.
Now, is this inconsistent with our earlier position? And the
analogy I take is that if somebody is about to shoot my wife, I
am entitled to shoot that person. That does not produce the
conclusion that the law against murder is wrong. The law
against murder still exists, but there can be quite exceptional
circumstances when you are entitled to break that law and a
court would take a lenient view of you in those circumstances,
but it would depend on the circumstances. So to take the case
that you raised, Steve, that suppose that the information turned
out to be right, you've got the information, you did indeed find a
nuclear device and you defused it and you saved Manhattan
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going up, I think that no court would convict you for the means
which you had taken to prevent that happening.
Suppose you were wrong. Well, just as if it turns out that
the person who was threatening my wife only had a dummy gun,
then the courts would have to decide whether I had acted in
good faith or not. I suspect that as long as they thought I had
acted in good faith, again they would take a lenient view. So
that is my analogy. I see the analogy as one of self-defense.
The point I'm really wanting to make is, I don't think that the
forbidding of torture can be absolute. There can always be
circumstances in which you can find it theoretically justified, but
that does not undermine the general position that torture should
be against the law.
PROFESSOR SHEPPARD: Are there are final thoughts
you would like to share with each of us, and perhaps if we could
begin with Mr. Mora these will be each of our last words.
MR. MORA: I'll just continue the analogy that Lord
Butler was making. I think he's got it exactly right in that
analogy. I will add the following as a legal matter and it's
getting back to the underlying policy of law or philosophy of the
law. If we were to adopt Alan Dershowitz's view-and we
haven't raised his name but he's the Harvard law professor who
advocated for the legalization of torture under a torture
warrant. 13 More broadly, if we analyze what the consequences
would be of the legalization of cruelty, then my view has been
that this necessarily entails a repeal of the Doctrine of
Inalienable Rights or at least the doctrine that every individual
has an inalienable right to be free from cruelty. If you think
about the implications of that repeal, then you'll understand that
the destruction, necessary destruction, that would ensue to our
entire legal system would be enormous.
13. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor
Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 275 (2004); Alan M. Dershowitz, German Issue Is One
For US. Too: Can Torture, Or The Threat Of It, Be Right?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at
B 15; Alan M. Dershowitz, A Challenge to House Master Hanson, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 2,
2002, at 9; Alan M. Dershowitz, The Public Must Know If Torture Is Used, AGE, Mar. 15,
2003, at 9; Alan M. Dershowitz, Warrant Would Make Those Using Torture Accountable,
FIN TIMES, June 8, 2002, at 8; Alan M. Dershowitz, Yes, It Should Be 'On The Books',
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at A15; Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a
Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19.
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We in the United States and the U.K. might say, well, this
would be a temporary abridgment; it would be only limited to
situations in which there are weapons of mass destruction that
are threatened against populations. But if you repeal the right
and the individual no longer possesses it, then what is to stop
another regime, an Algerian regime or an Ugandan regime
saying, that's the West, that right certainly does not apply any
longer; we're going to apply cruelty to individuals who criticize
the president. Once the person no longer holds this right, it
becomes a matter of State discretion or State grace. The State
has the right by default to decide whether or not it will apply
cruelty or not. Then the inroads and corrosive effect on the
whole notion of rights and human rights would be inevitable.
The world would not be a better place long-term if that were to
be done, which is why I go back to the necessity of maintaining
the illegality of cruelty, understanding that there may be
situations, extreme situations, and very unusual situations, such
as the ticking bomb scenario, where a jury might decide to
nullify a sentence under some circumstances. But when you
think through these kinds of issues, I think you'll come to the
conclusion that we have no alternative but to preserve the legal
prohibition and ethical prohibition against the application of
cruelty.
MR. TAFT: Well, I don't think that I have a great deal to
add to what has already been said, but I would like to suggest
that these are important subjects and that the difficulties that
were addressed in the second part-in gathering intelligence,
and monitoring the gathering of it, and the extent to which that
infringes on civil liberties are extremely complicated questions.
They're not going to get any easier as time goes on and as our
technology develops and it becomes simpler or more possible to
invade people's privacy, as Lord Butler puts it, in ways that we
hardly dream of now. In that sense it's not too late for the
people here to become involved in these things. They have not
been solved. They will be before too long after I've gone and
I'm delighted to have had an opportunity to at least raise them.
They will be very important issues over the next twenty to thirty
years, particularly as technology develops and the threats
develop.
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LORD BUTLER: My final word is just to add to this point
about torture. We've had a whole lot of high-flown reasons,
reasons of standards, of human rights, why torture is wrong; but
there's one thing we haven't mentioned that we should include
for completeness-and that is, it doesn't work. It's not an
effective way of getting intelligence out of people because
somebody under torture will tell you whatever they think is
necessary to get the pain to stop and there's no reason to think
that that is the truth. And the same is true for other means of
abstracting information from people, like blackmail and like
money.
I think that the thought to leave with you-the most reliable
way of getting intelligence out of human agents is to establish a
commonality of interest where you've got a willing cooperator
who is cooperating for their reasons and not just for yours. A
point I made earlier this afternoon is that intelligence gathering
is often thought of being as an amoral, perhaps even an immoral
activity. It is actually something where integrity on the part of
the gatherer is as important as it is in any other area of
government activity.
PROFESSOR SHEPPARD: Thank you very much, Lord
Butler. Thank you all for a wonderful afternoon.
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